Abstract: The aim of this paper is to discuss the role of the returns to scale at the private and social levels on the local determinacy properties of the steady state in a continuous-time two-sector economy with sector-specific externalities. First we show that when labor is inelastic, for any configuration of the returns to scale, local indeterminacy is obtained if there is a capital intensity reversal between the private and the social levels. Second, we prove that when labor is infinitely elastic, saddle-point stability is obtained as soon as the investment good sector has constant social returns while local indeterminacy arises if the investment good sector has increasing social returns, provided the consumption good is labor intensive at the social level and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption admits intermediary values. Finally, our main conclusion shows that local indeterminacy requires a low elasticity of labor when the investment good has constant social returns, but requires either low enough or large enough elasticity of labor when the investment good has increasing social returns.
Introduction
The existence of local indeterminacy in infinite-horizon models with externalities is a well established fact. 1 As initially shown by Benhabib and Farmer [2] , this conclusion is generally a consequence of large enough increasing returns at the social level, a large enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and a large enough elasticity of the labor supply. 2 It is worth noting however that all these contributions deal either with an aggregate model or with a two-sector model characterized by identical technologies at the private level.
As increasing returns do not clearly appear to be supported by empirical evidences, 3 Benhabib and Nishimura [6] have shown in a seminal contribution that local indeterminacy is also compatible with constant returns at the social level in a two-sector model with sector-specific externalities. Assuming a linear utility function with respect to consumption, they have proved that this result is based on a capital intensity reversal, the consumption good being capital intensive at the private level but labor intensive at the social level. More interestingly, this result is established without any restriction on the elasticity of labor supply.
Generalizing the Benhabib-Nishimura formulation by the consideration of a non-linear utility function with respect to consumption, Nishimura and Venditti [14] and Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [8] have shown that while local indeterminacy is fundamentaly based on a large elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, it requires a low enough elasticity of the labor supply. Moreover, they have proved that saddle-point stability is ensured as soon as the elasticity of the labor supply is large enough. Clearly, this last conclusion appears to be in complete opposition with the results derived under increasing social returns within aggregate or two-sector models. Our goal in the present paper is to understand such a drastic difference between the two formulations. We will show that this can be explained by the use of different assumptions on the returns to scale.
We consider a two-sector model with Cobb-Douglas technologies, sector-1 See Benhabib and Farmer [4] for a survey of the literature. 2 See also among others Benhabib and Farmer [3] , Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti [12] , Nishimura, Nourry and Venditti [13] , Pintus [15] , Wen [16] . 3 See Basu and Fernald [1] .
specific externalities, endogenous labor and a non-linear separable CES utility function. We use different technologies at the private level (the capital intensity difference at the private level is non zero) in order to deal with a general model. Moreover, we assume that one of the two sectors has constant social returns to scale while the other sector has constant returns either at the private or at the social level. Proceeding that way, we get a framework compatible with both the Benhabib-Farmer [3] and the Benhabib-Nishimura [6] formulations. We first show that when labor is inelastic, for any of the two configurations for the returns to scale, local indeterminacy is obtained under the same type of condition exhibited by Benhabib and Nishimura [6] , namely a capital intensity reversal between the private and the social levels. We then clearly establish the robustness of this condition in particular when the social returns to scale are increasing.
Second, we prove that when labor is infinitely elastic, saddle-point stability, and thus local determinacy, is obtained as soon as the investment good sector has constant social returns. On the contrary, if the investment good sector has increasing social returns, local indeterminacy arises provided the consumption good is labor intensive at the social level and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption admits intermediary values.
In the general configuration, we finally prove that local indeterminacy requires a low elasticity of labor when the investment good has constant social returns, but requires either a low enough or a large enough elasticity of labor when the investment good has increasing social returns. More generally, we show that when mild externalities, i.e. weakly increasing social returns in the investment good sector, are considered, local indeterminacy is ruled out for intermediary values of the elasticity of labor supply. To summarize, we clearly establish that the drastic difference between the Benhabib-Farmer [3] and the Benhabib-Nishimura [6] formulations fundamentaly relies on the returns to scale at the social level in the investment good sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model, the intertemporal equilibrium, the steady state and the characteristic polynomial. The main results are exposed in Section 3. Some concluding comments are provided in Section 4 and all the proofs are in a final Appendix.
The model 2.1 The production structure
We consider an economy producing a pure consumption good y 0 and a pure capital good y 1 . Each good is produced by capital x 1j and labor x 0j , j = 0, 1, through a Cobb-Douglas technology which contains sector specific externalities. The representative firm in each industry faces the following technology, called private production function:
with β ij > 0. The positive externalities are equal to
with b ij ≥ 0 and X ij denoting the average use of input i in sector j. We assume that these economy-wide averages are taken as given by each individual firm. At the equilibrium, since all firms of sector j are identical, we have X ij = x ij and we define the social production functions as follows
withβ ij = β ij + b ij . In order to consider mild external effects and to avoid endogenous growth, we assume thatβ ij < 1, i, j = 0, 1. We do not a priori impose any restriction on the returns to scale at the private and social levels. However, we will be interested in the analysis of two standard configurations: a first one with constant social returns and thus decreasing private returns, a second one with constant private returns and thus increasing social returns. Choosing the consumption good as the numeraire, i.e. p 0 = 1, a firm in each industry maximizes its profit given the output price p 1 , the rental rate of capital w 1 and the wage rate w 0 . The first order conditions subject to the private technologies (1) give
We call a ij the input coefficients from the private viewpoint. Considering that the total labor is given by = x 00 + x 01 , and the total stock of capital is given by x 1 = x 10 + x 11 , the factor market clearing equation is directly obtained from the private input coefficients as defined by (3):
Using the fact that the input coefficients from the private viewpoint a ij are functions of w and p, i.e. a ij = p j β ij /w i = a ij (w i , p j ), a total differenciation of the above factor market clearing equation gives: 
We get p jβij =â ij w i , and taking the sum over i gives the price equation
We callâ ij the input coefficients from the social viewpoint. 4 Substituting the first order conditions (3) into the social production function (2) and solving for p j gives the input coefficients from the social viewpointâ ij as functions of w and y:
Substituting this expression into (6) gives the factor-price frontier: Using the fact that the input coefficients from the social viewpointâ ij are functions of w and y, a direct differenciation of the factor-price frontier gives: Lemma 4. Denote dp = (0, dp 1 ) and dw = (dw 0 , dw 1 ) . Then dp = 
Note that the first term on the right-hand-side is obtained from the equivalence between (6) and (7) . Solving equations (4) and (8) with respect to dy and dw allows to compute the partial derivatives [dy/dx], [dy/dp], [dw/dx] and [dw/dp] (see Appendix 5.2 for details). In the following we will then treat y and w as functions of x and p, namely y j =ỹ j (x 1 , , p 1 ) and w j =w j (x 1 , , p 1 ), j = 0, 1. 5
Intertemporal equilibrium and steady state
The economy is populated by a large number of identical infinitely-lived agents. We assume without loss of generality that the total population is constant and normalized to one. At each period a representative agent supplies elastically an amount of labor ∈ (0,¯ ), with¯ ≥ 1 his endowment of labor. He then derives utility from consumption c and leisure L =¯ − according to the following function
with σ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0 and A a normalization constant. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is thus given by c = 1/σ while the elasticity of the labor supply is given by = 1/γ. Considering the external effects (e 0 , e 1 ) as given, profit maximization in both sectors described in Section 2.1 gives demands for capital and labor as functions of the capital stock, the production level of the investment good, total labor and the external effects, namelyx ij = x ij (x 1 , y 1 , , e 0 , e 1 ), i, j = 0, 1. The production frontier is then defined as c = T (x 1 , y 1 , , e 0 , e 1 ) =x β 00 00x β 10 10 e 0 From the envelope theorem we easily get w 1 = T 1 (x 1 , y 1 , , e 0 , e 1 ), p 1 = −T 2 (x 1 , y 1 , , e 0 , e 1 ) and w 0 = T 3 (x 1 , y 1 , , e 0 , e 1 ). 5 Note that if the returns to scale are constant at the social level, then 1 −β0j −β1j = 0 and the factor prices wj are functions of the output price only, i.e. wj = wj(p1), j = 0, 1.
The intertemporal optimization problem of the representative agent can be described as:
where δ ≥ 0 is the discount rate and g > 0 is the depreciation rate of the capital stock. We can write the modified Hamiltonian in current value as:
with q 1 (t) the Lagrange multiplier which corresponds to the utility price of capital in current value. The necessary conditions for a solution of the above dynamic optimization problem are given by the following equations:
(12) As shown in Section 2.1, we have in the general case w 0 =w 0 (x 1 , , p 1 ) and c =ỹ 0 (x 1 , , p 1 ) = T (x 1 ,ỹ 1 (x 1 , , p 1 ), , e 0 (x 1 , , p 1 ), e 1 (x 1 , , p 1 )). Therefore, solving equation (10) describing the labor-leisure trade-off at the equilibrium, we express the labor supply as a function of the capital stock and the output price, = (x 1 , p 1 ), and we get (12) , the equations of motion are finally derived aṡ
Note that E(x 1 , p 1 ) is equal to 1 minus the product of the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption by the elasticity of the consumption good's output with respect to the price of the investment good.
Any solution {x 1 (t), p 1 (t)} t≥0 that also satisfies the transversality condition lim
is called an equilibrium path. A steady state is defined by a pair (x * 1 , p * 1 ) solution of
In order to simplify the analysis, we use the normalization constant A which enters the utility function in order to choose a particular value for the steady state labor supply. We get the following result:
For any given σ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0, there is a unique value A * > 0 such that when A = A * , there exists a unique steady state
Moreover, the expressions (x * 1 , p * 1 ) do not depend on the preference parameters σ and γ.
The nice feature of this normalization is that the steady state remains constant while the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption or the elasticity of the labor supply are varied. This allows to provide a clear analysis of the local stability properties of the equilibrium path.
Characteristic polynomial
Linearizing the dynamical system (13) around (x * 1 , p * 1 ) gives:
As we show in Appendix 5.2, all these partial derivatives are functions of σ and γ. The role of γ of course occurs through the presence of endogenous labor but remains implicit at that stage mainly because of our methodology to derive the dynamical system (13) from the first order conditions (9)- (12) . Any solution from (13) that converges to the steady state (x * 1 , p * 1 ) satisfies the transversality condition and is an equilibrium. Therefore, given x 1 (0), if there is more than one initial price p 1 (0) in the stable manifold of (x * 1 , p * 1 ), the equilibrium path from x 1 (0) will not be unique. In particular, if J has two eigenvalues with negative real parts, there will be a continuum of converging paths and thus a continuum of equilibria.
Definition 1. If the locally stable manifold of the steady state
is said to be locally indeterminate.
The eigenvalues of J are given by the roots of the following characteristic polynomial
Local indeterminacy requires therefore that D(σ, γ) > 0 and T (σ, γ) < 0.
Note from Appendix 5.2 that if constant social returns to scale are assumed in both sectors then ∂w 1 /∂x 1 = 0 and the Determinant and Trace are equal to the expressions obtained by Benhabib and Nishimura [6] with σ = 0 or by Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [8] with σ > 0.
Main results
Our objective is to study the impact of the returns to scale at the private and social levels on the local determinacy properties of the steady-state. In order to simplify the analysis and to consider a framework as close as possible to the formulations of Benhabib and Farmer [3] , Harrison [10] , Harrison and Weder [11] , when one sector will be characterized by increasing social returns, we will assume that the other sector has constant social returns.
We build the analysis by considering two polar cases. In the first case we consider the model with inelastic labor (γ = +∞). In the second case we assume a linear utility function with respect to labor, i.e. an infinite elasticity of the labor supply (γ = 0). We finally derive conclusions for the general case with γ ∈ (0, +∞). . It follows that it is not possible to maintain capital stocks beyond
Therefore, we conclude from (2) that the consumption path is necessarily bounded as c(t) ≤xβ 10 1¯ β 00 ≡c. As a result, when γ is arbitrarily large, the first order condition (10) must imply that the labor supply satisfies
converges to −∞ as lim γ→+∞ (t) = +∞ and c(t) is bounded from above.
In such a case, (t) = c(t) = 0 would produce a higher utility integral which is equal to 0.
Local indeterminacy with inelastic labor supply
When σ ≥ 0 and γ = +∞, we have a formulation with inelastic labor. We get indeed from (10) (see Remark 1) that lim γ→+∞ (t) = 1 and thus lim γ→+∞ (t) 1+γ /(1 + γ) = 0. The utility function then becomes u(c) =
As initially shown by Benhabib and Nishimura [6] , the local indeterminacy properties within two sector models are based on the capital intensity difference across sectors at the private and social levels. Using the definitions of input coefficients given in Section 2.1 allows to characterize these capital intensity differences as follows:
Definition 2. The consumption good is said to be: i) capital intensive at the private level if and only if a 11 a 00 −a 10 a 01 < 0, ii) capital intensive at the social level if and only ifâ 11â00 −â 10â01 < 0.
We can conveniently relate these input coefficients to the Cobb-Douglas parameters:
Proposition 2. At the steady state: i) the consumption good is capital (labor) intensive from the private perspective if and only if
ii) the consumption good is capital (labor) intensive from the social perspective if and only ifb
Under constant social returns in both sectors and a linear utility function with respect to consumption (σ = 0), Benhabib and Nishimura [6] have proved that local indeterminacy arises if the consumption good is capital intensive from the private perspective (b < 0), but labor intensive from the social perspective (b > 0). Building on the same technological restrictions, we obtain the following conclusions: Theorem 1. Let γ = +∞ and consider the critical valuê
Then the following results hold: i) When both sectors have constant social returns, i.e. 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 1 −β 01 −β 11 = 0, the steady state is locally indeterminate if and only if
with σ * =σ. ii) When the investment good sector has constant social returns, i.e. 1 −β 01 −β 11 = 0, while the consumption good sector has increasing social returns, i.e. 1 −β 00 −β 10 < 0, there existsḡ > 0 such that the steady state is locally indeterminate if
, g ∈ (0,ḡ) and σ ∈ [0, σ * )
iii) When the investment good sector has increasing social returns, i.e. 1 −β 01 −β 11 < 0, while the consumption good sector has constant social returns, i.e. 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 0, the steady state is locally indeterminate if
Note that all the three configurations require the same restriction on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, namely ε c = 1/σ needs to be larger than the inverse of the elasticity of the consumption good's output with respect to the price of the investment good, i.e. ε c > 1/σ * = (p * 1 /c * )(∂c/∂p 1 ). This restriction implies thus that E(x * 1 , p * 1 ) > 0. However, increasing returns at the social level allow to get local indeterminacy with lower values for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption than in the case with constant social returns. As the consumption good is assumed to be capital intensive at the private level, i.e. b < 0, we have indeed in ii) and iii), σ * >σ.
The intuition for the existence of local indeterminacy and expectationdriven fluctuations in two-sector models with sector-specific externalities and inelastic labor is now well-established. The basic conditions concern the technological side. As initially shown by Benhabib and Nishimura [5] , we need a capital-intensive consumption good sector at the private level in order to allow some oscillations of the capital stock "to get through" the Rybczinsky theorem. At the same time, as shown more recently by Benhabib and Nishimura [6] , we need a labor-intensive consumption good sector at the social level in order to allow some oscillations of the relative price of the investment good "to get through" the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and thus to produce multiple equilibria based on self-fulfilling expectations. But the properties of preferences also matter. The associated fluctuations in consumption levels along the equilibrium path require indeed a high enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption in order for the representative agent to compensate current loss of consumption by future gain. Theorem 1 shows that such a general mechanism holds for any type of returns to scale at the social level, and thus provides for the first time in the literature a general analysis of local indeterminacy in a two-sector model with increasing social returns. 6 
Local indeterminacy with infinitely elastic labor supply
When the utility function is such that σ ≥ 0 and γ = 0, we get a formulation with an infinitely elastic labor supply such that u(c, ) = As shown in Benhabib and Farmer [2] , Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti [12] , Nishimura, Nourry and Venditti [13] or Pintus [15] , the occurrence of local indeterminacy in aggregate models requires the consideration of a large enough (close to infinite) elasticity of the labor supply. Such a restriction is also necessary in two-sector models derived from Benhabib and Farmer [3] in which the technologies of both sectors are identical at the private level (b = 0) and the returns to scale are increasing at the social level. However, as we have shown with Theorem 1, two-sector models provide a framework in which local indeterminacy arises through different channels than aggregate models where the intertemporal allocations of labor play a crucial role. Indeed, in a multi-sector framework, the existence of a continuum of equilibria is based on intertemporal reallocations of productive factors between sectors and is fully compatible with inelastic labor, the returns to scale being constant or increasing at the social level.
Of course, an infinite number of equilibria can also occur within a twosector model with elastic labor. The following Theorem then provides an analysis of local indeterminacy with an infinitely elastic labor supply. We show that the results fundamentaly depend on the properties of the sectoral returns to scale at the social level. i) When the investment good sector has constant social returns, i.e. 1 − β 01 −β 11 = 0, the steady state is saddle-point stable for any σ ≥ 0.
ii) When the investment good sector has increasing social returns, i.e. 1 −β 01 −β 11 < 0, while the consumption good sector has constant social returns, i.e. 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 0, there exist > 0, σ > 0 andσ > σ such that the steady state is locally indeterminate if
and σ ∈ (σ,σ)
In case i), saddle-point stability is obtained for any type of social returns to scale in the consumption good sector, i.e. either when 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 0 or when 1 −β 00 −β 10 < 0. In case ii), as shown in Appendix 5.4, it is worth noting that the conditions for local indeterminacy imply that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is lower than the elasticty of the consumption good's output with respect to the price of the investment good, i.e. E(x * 1 , p * 1 ) < 0. Actually, we can show that when small externalities are considered, local indeterminacy is ruled out if E(x * 1 , p * 1 ) > 0:
Proposition 3. Let γ = 0,b > 0 and consider E(x 1 , p 1 ) as defined by (14) . There exists > 0 such that ifβ 01 +β 11 ∈ (1, 1 + ) and σ is fixed so as to imply E(x * 1 , p * 1 ) > 0, then D(σ, 0) < 0 and local indeterminacy is ruled out.
Theorem 2 shows that as soon as the investment good sector has constant social returns, the steady state is necessarily saddle-point stable for any value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and any amount of external effects. This result explains why local indeterminacy is ruled out in two-sector models with constant social returns to scale in both sectors and large values for the elasticity of the labor supply. 7 On the contrary, when the investment good sector has slightly increasing social returns and is capital intensive at the social level, local indeterminacy arises for intermediary values of the social capital intensity difference and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. Note that there is no particular restriction on the capital intensity difference at the private level. This fact suggests that our conclusions are compatible with twosector models in which the private technologies are identical across sectors, i.e. b = 0, as in Benhabib and Farmer [3] , Harrison [10] , Harrison and Weder [11] . Theorem 2 also confirms analytically a conclusion derived numerically by Harrison and Weder [11] : local indeterminacy can occur without external effect in the consumption good sector but fundamentaly requires externalities in the investment good sector. Note also that our results hold with almost constant social returns to scale and thus extremely small externalities in the investment good sector.
The intuition for the existence of local indeterminacy and expectationdriven fluctuations in two-sector models with sector-specific externalities, increasing social returns and infinitely elastic labor has been established by Benhabib and Farmer [3] . Starting from an arbitrary equilibrium, consider another one with a higher rate of investment. This would require a higher return on investment. But if higher anticipated stocks of future capital raise the marginal product of capital by drawing labor out of leisure, 7 See Nishimura and Venditti [14] for discrete-time models and Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [8] for continuous-time models.
or by reallocating labor across sectors, the expected higher rate of return can be self-fulfilling when there are enough increasing returns in the investment good sector to amplify the movement of labor into production and to provide a sufficient boost to private returns to justify multiple equilibria. Such a scenario requires a minimal amount of increasing returns to scale when the labor supply is infinitely elastic as labor can be easily drawn into employment. It is also based on large enough values for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption which allows the representative agent to compensate current loss of consumption by future gain. 8 
Local indeterminacy with elastic labor supply
Building on Theorems 1 and 2, we now provide a complete picture of the existence of local indeterminacy when σ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 depending on the properties of the social returns to scale in both sectors. ii) When the investment good sector has constant social returns, i.e. 1 −β 01 −β 11 = 0, while the consumption good sector has increasing social returns, i.e. 1 −β 00 −β 10 < 0, consider σ * as defined by (20) and the critical valueḡ as given in Theorem 1ii). For any g ∈ (0,ḡ) and σ ∈ [0, σ * ), there exists a bound γ(σ) > 0 such that the steady state is locally indeterminate if
and γ > γ(σ). iii) When the investment good sector has increasing social returns, i.e. 1 −β 01 −β 11 < 0, while the consumption good sector has constant social returns, i.e. 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 0, consider σ andσ as given in Theorem 2iii). There exist > 0, γ(σ) > 0 andγ(σ) > γ(σ) such that for anŷ β 01 +β 11 ∈ (1, 1 + ) , the steady state is locally indeterminate if
(1−β 01 −β 11 )(δ+g) β 11 β 11 g ,β 01 β 11 δ β 00β11 (δ+g) and one of the following sets of conditions hold: a: σ ∈ [0,σ) and γ ∈ (γ(σ), +∞], b: σ ∈ (σ,σ) and γ ∈ [0, γ(σ)).
Theorem 3 shows that when the investment good sector has constant social returns, the existence of local indeterminacy is based on a large enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and a low enough elasticity of the labor supply. But, when the investment good sector has slightly increasing social returns, local indeterminacy requires intermediary values for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and extreme values for the elasticity of the labor supply. In other words, local indeterminacy is ruled out for intermediary values of γ. This result explains why all the literature dealing with increasing social returns only focusses on configurations with γ close enough to zero. The occurrence of saddlepoint stability as γ is progressively increased from 0 has suggested that local indeterminacy would require a large elasticity of the labor supply as in aggregate models. However, we prove that this is not true as indeterminacy also arises when the labor supply is weakly elastic. Note also that the consideration of a low elasticity of labor supply appears to be much more empirically plausible as shown by Blundell and McCurdy [7] .
The intuition that supports our findings in Theorem 3 is quite obvious from what we described previously. First, no matter what the returns to scale in the two sectors are, the same basic mechanim as the one presented in Section 3.1 always holds: Beside a capital intensity reversal between the private and social levels, and a large enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, local indeterminacy requires a low enough elasticity of the labor supply in order to prevent the agent from smoothing the fluctuations in his wage and capital incomes associated with the fluctuations in the capital stock. 9 Second, when the investment good sector has increasing social returns, a second mechanism identical to the one presented in Section 3.2 is simultaneously at work. Beside a mild amount of increasing returns and intermediary values for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, local indeterminacy also occurs if the elasticity of the labor supply is large enough to draw labor out of leisure and to generate reallocations of inputs across sectors.
Remark 2: In case i) of Theorems 1 and 3 we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for local indeterminacy as we are able to apply a geometrical methodology initially introduced by Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder [9] . 10 Indeed, under constant social returns in both sectors, the determinant D can be obtained as a linear function of the trace T when σ or γ is varied. On the contrary, as soon as increasing social returns to scale are introduced in one of the two sectors, the complexity of the formulation prevents from having a simple relationship between D and T . That is why we provide only sufficient conditions.
Concluding comments
We have considered a two-sector economy with CES technologies containing sector-specific externalities and additively separable CES preferences defined over consumption and leisure. We have discussed the existence of local indeterminacy depending on the returns to scale at the private and social level. Two basic configurations have been explored: constant social and decreasing private returns to scale as in Benhabib and Nishimura [6] , or increasing social and constant private returns to scale as in Benhabib and Farmer [2, 3] .
We may summarize our main findings with the following two tables. Consider first the case in which the consumption good sector has constant or increasing social returns while the investment good sector has constant social returns. We have found some critical values σ * > 0 and γ > 0 such that local indeterminacy arises when "Yes" occurs:
fluctuations in income are thus smoothed and the business cycles can be eliminated. Conversely, when the labor supply is not very elastic, fluctuations in the capital stock generate fluctuations in incomes and business cycles become persistent.
10 See Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [8] for details.
Consider now the case in which the consumption good sector has constant social returns while the investment good sector has increasing social returns. We have found some critical valuesσ > σ > 0 andγ > γ > 0 such that local indeterminacy arises when "Yes" occurs:
We have then proved that the conditions for the existence of local indeterminacy are strongly affected by the assumptions made on the returns to scale in the investment good sector. Note however that in every configuration a large enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution is required, i.e. σ close enough to zero. It would be worthwhile to generalize the formulation of preferences by considering a non-separable utility function across consumption and leisure, and to check whether this restriction could be relaxed. This is left for future research.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
Maximizing the profit subject to the private technologies (1) gives the first order conditions p j β ij y j /x ij = w i , i, j = 0, 1 (22) Considering the steady state with y 1 = gx 1 and w 1 = (δ + g)p 1 , we get
Using the social production function (2) for the investment good we derive
and thus (25) From x 1 = x 10 + x 11 we derive
Finally we easily obtain from (22): 
Considering (25), (27) and x 00 + x 01 = , x 1 = x 10 + x 11 , we get The substitution of (26) and (28) Finally, using (22), (28) and (29) into (10) gives then * =l and the result follows. Note that the values of * and A * are well-defined for any σ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0.
Computation of D(σ, γ) and T (σ, γ)
Consider the expressions (18) of the Trace and Determinant, and let y 0 = c. We need therefore to compute the following derivatives of y and w, namely: ∂c/∂x 1 , ∂c/∂p 1 , ∂y 1 /∂x 1 , ∂y 1 /∂p 1 , ∂w 0 /∂x 1 , ∂w 0 /∂p 1 , ∂w 1 /∂x 1 and ∂w 1 /∂p 1 . We use a procedure by substitution starting from the total differenciations of the factor-price frontier and the factor market clearing equation given in Lemmas 2 and 4. Solving equation (8) in Lemma 4 with dx 1 = 0, we get the derivatives of the wage rate and of the rental rate with respect to the price of investment good:
dw 0 dp 1 = −â 10 »β 01 +β 11 −(1−β 01 −β 11 ) p 1 y 1 dy 1 dp 1 +(1−β 00 −β 10 )β 11 β 10 p 1 c dc dp 1 -a 11â00 −â 10â01 dw 1 dp 1 =â 00 »β 01 +β 11 −(1−β 01 −β 11 ) p 1 y 1 dy 1 dp 1
Similarly, solving equation (8) in Lemma 4 with dp 1 = 0, we get the derivatives of the wage rate and the rental rate with respect to the stock of capital
Note that if we assume constant social returns as in Benhabib and Nishimura [6] , then 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 0. It follows that the rental rate only depends on the price of the investment good as dw 1 /dx 1 = dw 0 /dx 1 = 0. Moreover, we derive from (31) that the derivatives dw 1 /dp 1 and dw 0 /dp 1 depend on the capital intensity difference across sectors at the social level and correspond to the Stolper-Samuelson effects. Consider now equation (4) in Lemma 2. We easily derive from the definition of input coefficients at the private level (3) that
Moreover, we derive from the factor market clearing equation given in Lemma 1 that
Substituting these expressions into (4) and solving for the derivatives of the two ouput levels with respect to the price of investment good under the restriction dx 1 = 0, we get after tedious but straightforward algebra:
(β 00 a 01 x 1 +β 10 a 11 ) − d dp 1 a 11 +Tâ 00 (β 00 a 00 x 1 +β 10 a 10 ) c + x 1 (1 −β 00 −β 10 ) − d dp 1 a 10 −Tâ 01
with T = (a 11 a 00 − a 10 a 01 ) −1 ,T = (â 11â00 −â 10â01 ) −1 and
(1 −β 00 −β 10 )(β 01 a 01 x 1 +β 11 a 11 )y 1 + (1 −β 01 −β 11 )(β 00 a 00 x 1 +β 10 a 10 )c
Substituting these expressions into (31) we get dw 0 dp 1
(1 −β 01 −β 11 )β 10 a 10 c + (1 −β 00 −β 10 )β 11 a 11 y 1 + x 1 (1 −β 00 −β 10 )(1 −β 01 −β 11 ) dw 1 dp 1
(1 −β 01 −β 11 )β 00 a 10 c + (1 −β 00 −β 10 )β 01 a 11 y 1
Proceeding similarly, substituting expressions (33) and (34) into (4) and solving for the derivatives of the two ouput levels with respect to the stock of capital under the restriction dp 1 = 0, we now get:
Substituting these two expressions into (32) and solving for the derivatives of the wage rate and the rental rate with respect to the capital stock yields
(1 −β 00 −β 10 )β 11 a 01 y 1 + (1 −β 01 −β 11 )β 10 a 00 c
(1 −β 00 −β 10 )β 11 a 11 y 1 + (1 −β 01 −β 11 )β 10 a 10 c + x 1 (1 −β 00 −β 10 )(1 −β 01 −β 11 )
(1 −β 00 −β 10 )β 01 a 01 y 1 + (1 −β 01 −β 11 )β 00 a 00 c
(1 −β 00 −β 10 )β 01 a 11 y 1 + (1 −β 01 −β 11 )β 00 a 10 c (39) Finally, substituting these two expressions back in (38), we obtain
Note that if we assume constant social returns, i.e. 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 1 −β 01 − β 11 = 0, then these derivatives correspond to the Rybczynski effects either when labor is inelastic, i.e. γ = +∞, or when the utility function is linear with respect to consumption, i.e. σ = 0, as in these two cases d /dx 1 = 0 (see (42) below).
We have finally to derive the expressions of d /dx 1 and d /dp 1 . Total differenciation of equation (10) gives:
dw 0 dp 1 dp 1 − σ c dc dx 1 dx 1 + dc dp 1 dp 1
Assume first that dp 1 = 0. We then get:
Substituting dw 0 /dx 1 from (39) and dc/dx 1 from (40) (1 −β 01 −β 11 )(σβ 00 x 1 +β 10 a 10 c) + (1 −β 00 −β 10 )β 11 a 11 y 1 + x 1 (1 −β 00 −β 10 )(1 −β 01 −β 11 ) (44) Assume finally that dx 1 = 0. We then get d dp 1 = γ 1 w 0 dw 0 dp 1 − σ c dc dp 1 (45)
Substituting dw 0 /dp 1 from (37) and dc/dp 1 from (35) The expressions of D(σ, γ) and T (σ, γ) can be obtained after substitution of (35), (37), (39), (40), (43) and (46) into (18).
5.3
Proof of Theorem 1
Let γ = +∞. We then conclude from (43), (44) and (46) that d /dx 1 = d /dp 1 = 0 and F = 1. We also derive useful expressions for the wage rate and the rental rate for capital. Indeed, using the first order conditions (22), the expression of the stationary agregate capital stock (29) with * =l = 1, [8] . Note that the critical bound σ * is the value of σ such that E = 0, and is equal to
From (35), we get dc dp 1
Using (47), we then derive
ii) Assume now that 1 −β 00 −β 10 < 0 and 1 −β 01 −β 11 = 0. As b < 0 andb > 0 we get TT < 0 and thus D > 0. Consider the partial derivative dy 1 /dx 1 as given in (40). Using the definition of input coefficients at the social level (5) we get with * =l = 1:
From (27) we know that a 11 a 00 a 10 a 01
From Lemma 1 we also derive that at the steady state a 10 c = x 1 (1 − ga 11 ). But we know from (23), (25) and (29) ""
We then get from all this and Proposition 2
(1−β 00 −β 10 ) bβ 00
As b < 0 we have T < 0. It follows that dy/dx 1 < 0 if
Consider the partial derivative dw 1 /dp 1 as given in (37 Proceeding as previously we then derive dw 1 dp 1
=T Dcβ 00 β 00
Using the steady state relationships (15) we get
It follows then from (47)
From (36) we get
We finally derive from (47)
Substituting this expression into (53) finally gives after simplifications:
Consider the partial derivative dw 1 /dx 1 as given in (39). We get
(1 −β 00 −β 10 )β 01 a 01 y 1
As b < 0,b > 0 and thus TT < 0 we conclude that dw 1 /dx 1 < 0. Consider the partial derivative dy 1 /dp 1 as given in (35). We get:
dy 1 dp 1 = (δ+g) hβ 00 β 00 +β 10 β 10
Using again (47), we obtain dy 1 dp 1
Note then that if g = 0, we get dy 1 dp 1 = β 00 δ D(β 00 β 11 −β 10 β 01 )(β 00β11 −β 10β01 )
Therefore, there existsḡ > 0 such that when g ∈ (0,ḡ), dy 1 /dp 1 < 0.
Let us then assume that σ ∈ [0, σ * ), with σ * as defined by (48) so that E > 0. Using (49), (50) and (54) we derive that σ * =σ − Note now from (35) and (40) that dc dp 1 = − T DT w 0 w 1 (β 00 a 01 x 1 +β 10 a 11 ) > 0,
The result follows. iii) Assume finally that 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 0 and 1 −β 01 −β 11 < 0. Again, as b < 0 andb > 0 we get TT < 0 and thus D > 0. Consider the partial derivatives as given in (35), (39) and (40). We easily get dy 1 dp 1 = TT Dw 0 w 1 c (β 00 a 00 x 1 +β 10 a 10 )c − y 1 p 1 < 0 dc dp 1 = − TT Dw 0 w 1 (β 00 a 01 x 1 +β 10 a 11 ) > 0
Consider now the partial derivative dw 1 /dp 1 as given in (37). We derive at the steady state
β 00 β 00 +β 10 β 10
Using (47), we obtain after simplifications
We then derive
(1−β 10 −β 11 )(δ+g)−(1−β 11 )bβ 11 g bβ 11 g
As b < 0, it follows that δ + g − dw 1 /dp 1 < if b <
(1−β 10 −β 11 )(δ+g) (1−β 11 )β 11 g ≡b Let us then assume that σ ∈ [0, σ * ), with σ * as defined by (48) so that E > 0. Using (49), (50) and (54) we derive that
From all these results we conclude that if b <b,b > 0, and σ ∈ [0, σ * ), then D(σ, +∞) > 0. The result follows using again (56).
Proof of Theorem 2
Let γ = 0. We derive from (43) and (46) that
(1 −β 00 −β 10 )β 11 a 01 y 1 − (1 −β 01 −β 11 )β 10 (σ − a 00 c) d dp 1 Therefore we derive from (35), (37) and (40) dc dp 1 = −Tâ 10 c σw 0 , dw 1 dp 1 =Tâ 00 ,
=T
We also get from (14) E = 1 +T
Using all these results and (18), we find after simplifications
a 11â00 +â 10â11 w 1 w 0 < 0 so that indeterminacy is ruled out for any σ ≥ 0. Consider now the case with 1 −β 00 −β 10 < 0. It is easy to show that a 01 −(d /dx 1 )a 11 = 0. As a result we derive from (39) and (40), dw 1 /dx 1 = 0 so that the determinant D(σ, 0) simplifies as
Moreover we getF = a 11 c σ +T
Consider then the partial derivative dy 1 /dx 1 as given in (40). We obtain
and thus
Consider now the partial derivative dw 1 /dp 1 as given in (37). We get after simplifications dw 1 dp 1 =T w 0 1−β 00 −β 10 +σβ 00 T p 1 (1−β 00 −β 10 )β 11 w 0 w 1 +σ and thus
(1−β 00 −β 10 )β 11 +σ(β 00β11 −β 10β01 )
Consider now the partial derivative dc/dp 1 as given in (35). We have:
dc dp 1 = −T w 0â 10 ĉ T p 1 (1−β 00 −β 10 )β 11 w 0 w 1 +σ and thus
We then derive that
The numerator will be positive if and only if σ < ii) Assume now that 1 −β 01 −β 11 < 0 and thus 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 0. Consider the partial derivatives as given in (35), (37), (39) and (40). We easily get dy 1 dp 1 =T F w 0 w 1 c (β 10 a 10 c + σβ 00 x 1 ) − y 1 p 1 , dc dp 1 = −T F w 0â 10 a 11 , dw 1 dp 1 = σT F câ 00 a 11
From all these results we can compute Obviously we haveb 2 >b 1 and we can easily show that σ 2 > σ 1 . Note also that whenb >b 2 and σ < σ 2 then M y 1 /p 1 > 0.
We now compute the determinant:
Therefore, there exists 1 > 0 such that D(σ, 0) > 0 ifβ 01 +β 11 ∈ (1, 1 + 1 ), b >b 2 and σ ∈ (σ 1 , σ 2 ). Let us now compute the trace. We start with the following: It follows that there exists 2 > 0 such thatb 4 >b 2 whenβ 01 +β 11 ∈ (1, 1 + 2 ). Consider then the second part of the trace: It follows that T 2 < 0 ifb >b 2 and σ ∈ (σ 1 , σ 2 ). By definition we have T (σ, 0) = T 1 + σT 2 . Note that as σ 3 < σ 2 , if σ = σ 3 , then T 1 = 0 but T (σ, 0) = T 2 < 0. On the contrary, if σ = σ 2 , then N = 0 and T 2 = −∞ so that T (σ, 0) = −∞. Therefore, there existsσ ∈ (σ 3 , σ 2 ] such that when b ∈ (b 2 ,b 4 ), T (σ, 0) < 0 for any σ <σ.
To conclude, let = min{ 1 , 2 }, σ = σ 1 andσ =σ. Therefore, the steady state is locally indeterminate ifβ 01 +β 11 ∈ (1, 1 + ),b ∈ (b 2 ,b 4 ) and σ ∈ (σ,σ).
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the expression E = M/N given in the proof of Theorem 2. Assume that E > 0. As M > N , this is obtained if either N > 0 or M < 0.
i) Assume first that N > 0, i.e.b >b 2 and σ > σ 2 . Asb > 0, we get M y 1 /x 1 > 0 while M w 1 /p 1 < 0. It follows from (60) that there exists > 0 such that ifβ 01 +β 11 ∈ (1, 1 + ), D(σ, 0) < 0.
ii) Asume now that M < 0, i.e. eitherb >b 1 and σ < σ 1 , orb ∈ (0,b 1 ). Again, asb > 0, we get M y 1 /x 1 > 0 while M w 1 /p 1 < 0. It follows from (60) that there exists > 0 such that ifβ 01 +β 11 ∈ (1, 1 + ), D(σ, 0) < 0.
Proof of Theorem 3
Using Theorems 1 and 2, we prove the different subcases of Theorem 3: i) Let 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 1 −β 01 −β 11 = 0. The proof of this result is provided in Garnier, Nishimura and Venditti [8] . Note that the bound σ * is given by (50).
ii) Assume now that 1 −β 00 −β 10 < 0 and 1 −β 01 −β 11 = 0. As shown in Theorem 1ii), when γ = +∞, the steady state is locally indeterminate if , g ∈ (0,ḡ) and σ ∈ [0, σ * )
where the bound σ * is given by (55). On the contrary, we have proved with Theorem 2ii) that when γ = 0, the steady state is saddle-point stable for any σ ≥ 0. The result follows. iii) Assume finally that 1 −β 00 −β 10 = 0 and 1 −β 01 −β 11 < 0. As shown in Theorem 1iii), when γ = +∞ the steady state is locally indeterminate if b < and σ ∈ (σ,σ) with = min{ 1 , 2 }, σ = σ 1 andσ =σ ∈ (σ 3 , σ 2 ] as defined in Section 5.4. We easily derive that there exists 3 > 0 such that σ 2 < σ * ifβ 01 +β 11 ∈ (1, 1 + 3 ). As a resultσ < σ * , and denoting now = min{ 1 , 2 , 3 }, it follows that whenβ 01 +β 11 ∈ (1, 1 + ), we assume simultaneously all the following restrictions b <
(1−β 01 −β 11 )(δ+g) (1−β 11 )g ,b ∈ −
(1−β 01 −β 11 )(δ+g) β 11 β 11 g ,β 01 β 11 δ β 00β11 (δ+g) (61) and σ ∈ (σ,σ). The question is now to know whether local indeterminacy can occur for any γ ≥ 0 when the above conditions are satisfied. The answer is negative. Indeed, when γ = +∞, if σ <σ, then as shown in Section 5.3, E(x * 1 , p * 1 ) > 0. On the contrary, when γ = 0, ifb satisfies (61) and σ ∈ (σ,σ), then as shown in Section 5.4, E(x * 1 , p * 1 ) < 0. Note finally that when σ ∈ (σ,σ), E(x * 1 , p * 1 ) is a continous function of γ. It follows that there exist intermediary values for γ such that the determinant D(σ, γ) is negative. The result follows.
